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Samantar and Executive Power
Peter B. Rutledge*
ABSTRACT

This essay examines Samantar v. Yousuf in the context of
broader debate about the relationship between federal common
law and executive power. Samantar represents simply the latest
effort by the Executive Branch to literally shape the meaning of
law through a process referred to in the literature as "executive
lawmaking." While traditionalaccounts of executive lawmaking
typically have treated the idea as a singular concept, Samantar
demonstrates the need to bifurcate the concept into at least two
different categories:acts of executive lawmaking decoupled from
pending litigation and acts of executive lawmaking taken
expressly in response to litigation. As Samantar illustrates,
these latter acts of executive lawmaking raise special concerns
about separation of powers and politically motivated decisionmaking. They counsel in favor of judicial caution in accepting
such acts and, more generally, in favor of a more cautious
approach to the creation of federal common law, which invites
such acts.
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In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court held that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act generally did not cover claims against
individual government officers; instead, their immunity (if any) is
governed by federal common law.1 The decision already prompted

* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Dean Rebecca White
provided general financial support for this research. Amanda Holcomb provided firstclass research assistance. The University of Vienna Law School's Institut fir
Zivilverfahrensrecht provided facilities and secretarial support during the period of
research leave when I wrote this essay. To all these people and institutions, I offer my
heartfelt gratitude,
1.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292-93 (2010). The Court left open
the possibility that certain suits against individual officers might constitute the
functional equivalent of a suit against the state. Id. at 2292. Under these
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academic commentary, and elsewhere I have criticized the Court's
opinion for its failure to articulate a coherent theoretical basis for its
exercise of federal common law as well as for its failure to offer any
meaningful guidance about this important rule. 2
This essay focuses on one particular thread in Samantarnamely, the role of the Executive Branch in the immunity
determination after Samantar. Before the Supreme Court, the U.S.
government took the view that the scope of the foreign official's
common-law immunity turned exclusively on the Executive Branch's
determination of whether the official was entitled to it.3 The
government now appears to read Samantar to endorse that view, and
early indications suggest that courts will accept that view. 4
The government's position raises important issues about the
relationship between federal common law and executive power. That
relationship arises in other contexts both before the Supreme Court
and in the lower courts.5 Consequently, Samantar carries
implications not simply for the discrete issue of foreign official
immunity but also, more broadly, for the horizontal distribution of
authority among the branches of the federal government over civil
cases that touch upon the foreign relations of the United States. 6
My thesis is summarized as follows: Samantarrepresents simply
the most recent effort by the Executive Branch to assert that its
traditional foreign affairs power encompasses an ability to shape the
meaning of federal common law. This effort must be understood

circumstances, the Court suggested that the FSIA's protections might still attach. Id.
With little exception, the Court offered virtually no guidance on the circumstances that
would qualify for such treatment. Id.
2.
See Chim~ne I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and
Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1, 6-7 (2010) (describing the numerous
problems that result from reading suits against individuals into the FSIA); Peter B.
Rutledge, Samantar, Official Immunity and Federal Common Law, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 589, 590 (2011) (criticizing the Supreme Court for leaving open the possibility
that individual foreign officials not covered under the FSIA may nevertheless still be
entitled to immunity under federal common law); Beth Stephens, The Modern Common
Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669 (2011) (urging courts to
look to international and domestic immunity principles as well as human rights
doctrines in developing common law standards where there is little guidance from the
Supreme Court).
3.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 78, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter Samantar
Amicus Brief].
4.
Statement of Interest of the United States, Yousuf v. Samantar, (No. 1:04
CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Samantar Statement of Interest];
Order, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011)
(rejecting Samantar's "common law sovereign immunity defense" based entirely on the
government's determination that Samantar "does not have foreign official immunity").
See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
5.

6.

See Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S.

Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 915, 975 (2011)
(noting that sovereign state immunity determinations can implicate both federal
common lawmaking and executive lawmaking, creating separation of powers concerns).
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within a larger context of the various roles that the Executive Branch
can play in cases that touch upon the foreign relations of the United
States. Specifically, the Executive can play four roles: (a) offering
their views on the proper resolution of a legal question (not unlike
any other amicus curiae), (b) offering case-specific guidance to courts
on the foreign relations implications of a case (such as urging
dismissal of a case on grounds of comity), (c) undertaking official acts
that have doctrinal implications binding on courts (such as
recognizing foreign states or diplomats), and (d) affirmatively
asserting that the meaning of a legal question turns exclusively on
the answer given by the Executive Branch (such as the government's
view in Samantar).
Much of the academic literature in this area traditionally
collapses these last two roles into the single rubric of "executive
lawmaking."7 Contrary to that literature, Samantar demonstrates
the need to disaggregate this single category into at least two distinct
ones: cases where the Executive undertakes an act decoupled from
pending litigation, and cases where the Executive undertakes an act
in light of pending litigation. This latter sort of case raises troubling
tension with
implications, can create
separation-of-powers
congressional enactments, and undermines needed clarity in
important areas of law. These distinct problems should prompt courts
to be especially skeptical of executive lawmaking in this area and,
more generally, to be more cautious about manufacturing federal
common law doctrines that invite such claims by the Executive
Branch to complete deference.
This essay develops this thesis in three parts. Part I briefly
reviews Samantar and the government's position in that case. It then
contextualizes the government's position by comparing it to other
areas of law where the government sought to rely on the Executive
Branch's foreign affairs power to influence the shape of federal
common law. Part II articulates a model by which to conceptualize
the various roles that the Executive Branch can play in civil litigation
touching upon U.S. foreign relations. It then focuses on the role the
Executive Branch sought to play in Samantar-what I call the
"adjudicative role"-and identifies several problematic consequences
when the Executive Branch is permitted to play that role. Part III
anticipates and responds to several potential criticisms.

I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND EXECUTIVE POWER

Other essays in this symposium issue discuss Samantar'shistory
in greater detail, so I summarize only those bits of the history

7.

See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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essential to my argument.8 Samantar involved a suit by natives of
Somalia who alleged that Samantar, the former Prime Minister, first
Vice President, and Minister of Defense, had authorized extrajudicial
killings and torture of the plaintiffs or their family members during
the 1980s.9 During that time, the United States formally recognized
the military regime, of which Samantar was a part, as the lawful
government of Somalia.10 Following the fall of the military regime,
Samantar fled the country in 1991 and eventually became a resident
of Virginia." The district court held that Samantar was immune
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), but the Fourth
Circuit reversed and held that the FSIA does not apply to individual
government officers (leaving open the possibility that federal common
law doctrines might protect him).' 2
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Solicitor General
filed a brief on the merits. In that brief, the government took the
position that "principles adopted by the Executive Branch, informed
by customary international law, govern the immunity of foreign
officials acting in their official capacity."' 3 According to the
government, prior to the FSIA's enactment, the Executive Branch
controlled the determination of whether both foreign states and their
officials were entitled to a conduct-based immunity.14 While the FSIA
may have altered the mechanics by which a court determines the
immunity of foreign states, nothing in the act or its legislative history
indicated Congress's intent to alter the State Department's role with
respect to foreign officials (present or former).' 5
Thus according to the government's argument, as in the preFSIA context, the Executive Branch continues to control that
determination, a determination that binds the federal courts.16 In
other words, if the Executive Branch determines that the official is
immune, the court must dismiss the official from the case. If the
Executive Branch reaches the contrary conclusion, then dismissal, at
least on grounds of immunity, is inappropriate.
The Court's opinion says remarkably little to this point. On the
assumption that federal common law does supply an official

8.
See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, The Dog that Caught the Car: Observations
on the Past, Present,and Future Approaches of the Office of the Legal Adviser to Official
Acts Immunities, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (2011); David P. Stewart, The
Immunity of State Officials Under the UN Convention on JurisdictionalImmunities of
States and Their Property, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1047 (2011).
9.
Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir. 2009), affd, 130 S. Ct.
2278 (2010).
10.
Id.
Id. at 374.
11.
12.
Id. at 383-84.
13.
Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 8 (emphasis added).
14.
Id.
Id.
15.
16.
Id.
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7
immunity-a question technically left open by the Court's opinion' the Court states simply that it was "given no reason to believe that
Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate, the State
Department's role in determinations regarding individual official
immunities."18 This language hardly represents an express
endorsement of the rule that the government urged in its brief.
Admittedly, though, it can reasonably be read to endorse that view
(and it appears that the government has interpreted the decision to
endorse its position).19
Samantar is hardly the first case to raise important issues
regarding the intersection of federal common law and executive
power. In numerous other areas of law, both historical and recent, the
Court wrestled with this horizontal allocation of power between the
branches in matters of international civil litigation. Consider the
following examples:

*

Act of State Doctrine: In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
the Court announced the modern form of the act of state
doctrine under which courts will not sit in judgment of the
validity of the acts of foreign states taken within their
territory. 20 Subsequently, the Executive Branch urged the Court
to adopt the Bernstein exception under which courts would not
dismiss a case on the basis of the act of state doctrine when, in
the view of the Executive Branch, the case did not endanger the
21
foreign relations of the United States.

*

17.

Alien Tort Statute (ATS): In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court
held that federal courts enjoyed a limited power to recognize, as
a matter of federal common law, claims for violations of the law
of nations at least where the relevant norm had achieved the
necessary level of acceptance among civilized nations
comparable to the three paradigmatic claims that existed at the

See Rutledge, supra note 2.

Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010). In the footnote
18.
accompanying this quote, the Court described the history of the Executive Branch's
position on the FSIA and the State Department's longstanding position that the FSIA
did not deal with the immunity of individual officials. Id. at 2291 n.19
See Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4 (conveying to the Court
19.
the Department of State's determination that the defendant was not immune from
suit); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Symposium: Foreign State Immunity at
Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011) (noting the State Department's historic and continued
role in determining whether a foreign defendant is acting in an official capacity as an
agent of a legitimate government).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
20.
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 759-64
21.
(1972); Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954). See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 751-95 (4th ed. 2007)

(explaining the "act of state" doctrine and exceptions to the doctrine, including the
Bernstein exception).
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time of the ATS's adoption. 22 The Court rejected the Executive
Branch's view that judicial inference of a private right of action
from customary international law is inconsistent with
separation of powers principles.2 3 However, in recognition of the
Executive Branch's concern, the Court acknowledged that
federal courts could engage in case-specific deference to the
Executive Branch where it argued that a particular suit
interfered with its ability to exercise its control over foreign
relations. 24
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: In Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, the Court held that the FSIA covered conduct
predating the statute's enactment, even where the conduct
occurred at a time where "absolute immunity" was the
prevailing norm. 25 The Court rejected the Executive Branch's
argument that foreign sovereigns were absolutely immune for
such conduct. 26 Similar to Sosa, however, the Court
acknowledged that it would consider case-specific requests by
the government to dismiss such cases on the basis of their
foreign policy implications. 27

The unifying feature of these examples (and there are many
others) is that they are all instances of (a) federal common law
doctrines that take into account the case's foreign relations
implications and (b) different roles for the Executive Branch in
speaking to those foreign relations implications. In some cases, the
federal common law doctrine facilitates the exercise of jurisdiction
(e.g., Sosa and Altmann), and the Executive Branch can seek to trim
that exercise. In other instances, the federal common law doctrine
trims the exercise of jurisdiction (e.g., Sabbatino), and the Executive
Branch can re-enforce it. The examples illustrate the need for a
conceptual framework in which to think about the role of the
Executive Branch across the gamut of international civil litigation
matters.

22.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
23.
Reply Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 2,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
24.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.n.21.
25.
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
26.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14,
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13).
27.
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702.
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II. MODELS OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION

A rich literature has considered the proper role of the Executive
Branch in this field. 28 While this literature does some important
theoretical spadework, much work remains to be done. First, most of
the literature focuses primarily on the extent to which courts should
defer to executive interpretations of statutes, rather than federal
common law. 29 In the statutory context, the two branches are
competing for authority against the backdrop of a congressional
enactment. By contrast, in the context of federal common law, it is
precisely Congress's silence that supposedly gives rise to the need for
interstitial lawmaking by the federal courts.3 0
Second, most accounts take a rather mono-dimensional view of
what is termed "executive lawmaking." 3 Executive lawmaking is
generally understood to mean legal acts undertaken by the Executive
that carry doctrinal consequences for both pending and future
litigation. 32 An obvious example is the recognition of a foreign
diplomat or consular official; as a consequence of that act, the official
(if later named as a defendant in a civil suit) may be able to claim
immunity under the Diplomatic Relations Act and its accompanying
conventions (the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). 33

28.
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 659-63 (2000) (articulating a five-part model of deference to the Executive Branch
built partly on the premises underlying the Chevron doctrine); Derek Jinks & Neal
Kumar Katyal, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007) (urging a more skeptical approach toward
judicial deference to the Executive Branch in this area); Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (drawing
largely on Bradley's approach to argue explicitly for deference to the Executive Branch
in matters of foreign relations, focusing largely on federal statutes). For classic
historical contributions to this debate in the pre-FSIA context, see Michael H. Cardozo,
Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or
Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963) (arguing that the doctrine of
judicial deference to the Executive applies most strongly in the case of political
determinations in the field of foreign affairs); Philip C. Jessup, Has the Supreme Court
Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946) (arguing that the present
position of Supreme Court deference to the State Department on foreign relations
issues may be detrimental where the Executive Branch is performing a function that
should be carried out by the courts).
Jinks & Katyal, supranote 28.
29.
30.
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 347 (1981).
See Bradley, supra note 28; Jinks & Katyal, supra note 28.
31.
See Bradley, supra note 28, at 661 (describing Supreme Court deference to
32.
the Executive Branch's foreign affair powers, including the determination of immunity
for foreign heads of state and access of foreign governments to U.S. courts).
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 43, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
33.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21,
at 242, 255 (discussing immunity for senior governmental officials).
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The antiterrorism exception of the FSIA supplies another
example. By placing a foreign state upon the list of state sponsors of
terror, the State Department can offer plaintiffs another avenue
whereby to sue foreign state defendants under the FSIA. 34
Conversely, by removing a foreign state from the list (or declining to
place the state on the list), the State Department effectively cuts off
that avenue of access to the courthouse.3 5 Executive agreements
provide still another familiar example. In some cases, such
agreements can extinguish claims in civil courts against foreign
governments or foreign parties. 36
Samantar illustrates the need to disaggregate acts of executive
lawmaking into two different types of activities. Recall the
government's basic position: that it determines whether a foreign
official is entitled to immunity, and that determination binds a
court.37 That sort of executive lawmaking raises two distinct concerns
not present in other areas such as the recognition of diplomats. First,
it raises more serious separation-of-powers concerns.3 8 Executive
determinations pursuant to a statutory mandate (like the immunity
of credentialed diplomats) enjoy a congressional sanction (namely the
Diplomatic Relations Act).39 In contrast, executive determinations
about the meaning of federal common law lack any such sanction.
Second, the timing of the determination raises more serious
concerns about politically motivated decision making by the
Executive Branch. Executive determination to credential a diplomat
is decoupled from any litigation, whereas an executive determination
of whether a government official is entitled to immunity is, by
definition, made in the context of pending litigation. This enhances
the risk that the Executive Branch will base its determination on
political rather than principled grounds, either in pursuit of the State
Department's political agenda or in response to external pressure
from the foreign sovereign whose official is subject to the suit.
Thus, building on the prior literature in this area while at the
same time addressing its limitations, I propose to differentiate
between four different functions that the Executive Branch can play
40
in matters of international civil litigation:

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (2006) (granting a private right of action against a
34.
foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism).
35.
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2195 (2009).
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v.
36.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
37.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See Jessup, supra note 28 (arguing that the present position of Supreme
38.
Court deference to the State Department on foreign relations issues may be
detrimental where the Executive Branch is performing a function that should be
carried out by the courts).
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39.
I put to one side cases in which the Executive Branch is itself a party to the
40.
case. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005) (declining to apply
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*

The Amicus Function: In this capacity, the Executive Branch
simply files a brief urging the Court to interpret a federal
common law doctrine or to resolve a question of statutory
interpretation in a given way. The Executive Branch occupies a
position no different than other amici curiae who may have an
interest in the Court's resolution of a broad legal question. For
example, in its brief in American Isuzu Motors v. Ntsebeza, the
Executive Branch urged the Court to hold that the ATS does not
support claims predicated on theories of third-party liability
(like aiding and abetting liability).41 This function raises no
particular separation-of-powers concerns. The Court remains
independent and free to reject the Executive Branch's view and
resolve the matter a different way.

*

The Prudential Function: In this capacity, the Executive Branch
files a brief urging the Court to dismiss (or, less frequently, not
dismiss) a case on grounds related to one of the various federal
common-law doctrines such as comity or political question. A
request for case-specific deference (as envisioned by the Court in
Sosa and Altmann) exemplifies this sort of role.42 In contrast to
the amicus role, participation of this sort raises at least some
separation-of-powers concerns. The Executive Branch is urging
the Court not to observe its "unflagging obligation" to exercise
jurisdiction granted by Congress.48 Yet any fault for the
compromise on the court's obligation in this regard lies not with
the Executive Branch per se but with the Court for
manufacturing
doctrines
that
relax
its jurisdictional
obligation. 44

*

The Head of State Function: In this role, the Executive engages
in an act that has consequences for civil litigation but is
decoupled from the litigation. Examples include the recognition
international
credentialing
of
of
diplomats, 45
the
organizations, 46 some executive agreements, 47 and, to an extent,

the federal common law "revenue rule" to a fraud prosecution initiated by the United
States).
41.
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners at 8, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008)
(No. 07-919). In the interest of disclosure, I should note that I represented an amicus
curiae in that case.
42.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 725-27 (2004).
43.
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964);
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 404 (1821)).
44.
This problem is, of course, not limited to immunity determinations or, for
that matter, foreign relations cases. The general critique applies more globally to
common law doctrines like the political question doctrine and various abstention
doctrines, just to name a few.
45.
Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254c (2006).
46.
22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).
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the decision whether to list a state as a state sponsor of
terrorism. 4 8 In contrast to the prudential role, these actions
have greater separation-of-powers consequences. The judiciary
has no discretion to vary the consequences of an executive
action, which may have an outcome determinative effect on
litigation. Notably, however, the implications of these actions for
separation-of-powers are not so worrisome because (at least as
far as these examples) 49 they are often done pursuant to an
express grant of congressional authority.50 Moreover, because
the executive act is decoupled from present or pending litigation,
there is less concern that political considerations might be
influencing the Executive Branch's determination.
*

The Adjudicative Function: Here, the Executive is dictating the
content of a legal doctrine to which the judiciary, again, is
bound. Unlike the preceding category, however, the Executive's
position is developed directly in response to present or pending
litigation. Examples here include the State Department's view of
its role following Samantar, the decision to place a state on the
lists of state sponsors of terror after an act giving rise to
litigation,51 and some determinations about "head of state"
immunity.5 2 Several of these acts of executive lawmaking are
most problematic for they raise the concern that the Executive
Branch is, effectively, shaping the content of a legal doctrine to
suit a preferred policy outcome. Moreover, to the extent the
Executive is engaging in lawmaking without congressional
authorization (as, for example, in the Bernstein letter context), it
lacks the sanction of the other political branch with shared
53
responsibility for the foreign relations power.

See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 16-17 (describing executive
47.
agreements made either by the President and Congress or by the President alone,
which take the form of international agreements that have the same legal effects as
treaties).
48.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2006).
49.
Other examples of this sort of executive lawmaking such as head of state
immunity do not take place pursuant to legislative authorization. I address these in
greater detail infra, note 127.
See supra notes 45-48.
50.
51.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2).
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 257 (describing the Executive
52.
Branch's view that its "suggestions" of immunity with respect to foreign heads of state
are binding on courts).
By contrast, the post-conduct determination that a foreign state operated
53.
as a state sponsor of terror does not raise this problem because it occurs pursuant to
congressional authorization. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (authorizing a terrorism exception
to jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state where that state has been designated as a
state sponsor of terror). Similarly, the Diplomatic Relations Act authorizes the
President "on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms and conditions as he may
determine, specify privileges and immunities for the mission, the members of the
mission, their families, and the diplomatic couriers which result in more favorable
treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna Convention."
Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254c (2006).
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To this point, I have justified a novel framework for thinking
about the various roles played by the Executive Branch in matters of
international civil litigation, and I classified Samantar in that
framework. Now I wish to focus on why the adjudicative function (the
function at issue in Samantar) is especially troublesome. Two
concerns seem paramount.
First, the adjudicative role raises distinct separation-of-powers
considerations. Recall that the starting point of any case is an express
authorization of subject matter and personal jurisdiction by
Congress. 54 Many cases, moreover, will involve a congressionally
created cause of action, which the federal courts are designed to
vindicate. Courts resolve cases by principled, neutral application of
stable, predictable rules to the facts as developed in the litigation.
Seen against this backdrop, the adjudicative function threatens
separation-of-powers principles both with respect to Congress and
with respect to the courts. With respect to Congress, it hinges the
exercise of congressionally sanctioned jurisdiction on a post hoc
executive determination. 55 To the extent that the Executive
determines that an official is immune from suit, that determination
undermines the congressionally sanctioned scheme of jurisdiction and
relief. 56
With respect to the judiciary, it runs the risk that the immunity
determination will be the product of politically motivated decision
making rather than neutral application of legal principles. To the
extent that the Executive determines that an official is not immune,
the determination raises the risk that it will reflect a political
calculus by the Executive Branch (whether in response to foreign
political pressure or, alternatively, in an effort to advance an internal
political agenda). Consequently, "the Court becomes a mere errand

54.

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 275 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).
55.
Justice Jackson's familiar Youngstown framework lurks in the background
here. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 63438 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). I do not develop it fully in this essay but would
make several observations. First, some executive acts taken in the adjudicative
capacity-specifically those authorized by Congress-raise fewer separation-of-powers
concerns. As noted above, post hoc determinations that a foreign state should be listed
as a state sponsor of terror or post hoc determinations about diplomatic immunity fall
within this category. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. Second, when
dealing with the relationship between executive power and federal common law, cases
fall somewhere between Justice Jackson's second and third category. For reasons
indicated here, specifically the tension with the FSIA, I would be inclined to classify
the immunity determinations envisioned by the State Department after Samantar in
the third category. For a thoughtful explication of the relationship between Samantar
and the Youngstown framework, see Wuerth, supra note 6.
56.
See supra text accompanying note 43 (describing the Court's "unflagging
obligation" to exercise jurisdiction).

HeinOnline -- 44 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 895 2011

896

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 44:885

boy for the Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's
chestnuts from the fire but not others'.""
The executive intrusion into the judicial prerogative is not
limited to the determination of the applicable legal principle, but also
extends to the factual determinations underpinning the application of
that principle. Any immunity determination will turn not simply on
the law, but also the facts. In a judicial setting (or even an
administrative setting for that matter), the facts are developed in
accordance with specified procedures and rules governing pleading
and proof.5 8 By contrast, the State Department's methods for
gathering, weighing, and resolving conflicts among the factual
propositions relevant to immunity determinations lack any such
safeguards. This may be relatively innocuous in a case like Samantar
where the key facts appear to be relatively uncontested ones (the lack
of recognition of an official government and the present residence of
Samantar).5 9 They may be far more important in a case that turns on
whether a foreign official was acting in his "official capacity."60 Yet
the government's position effectively locks courts into accepting the
Executive Branch's factual determinations without any examination
of either their accuracy or the processes by which they were
determined.
Indeed, the threat to independent judicial determination is
arguably greater under the State Department's post-Samantar view
than was the case historically. As the Supreme Court noted in
Samantar, prior to the FSIA, the judicial role in the immunity
determination varied with the position taken by the Executive
Branch. 61 When the Executive Branch recommended immunity, the
Judicial Branch was bound by the recommendation and "surrendered
its jurisdictioh." 62 Conversely, when the Executive Branch did not
respond to a foreign sovereign's request for a suggestion of
"immunity," the courts could independently make the immunity
determination.63 Admittedly, in these cases, the court would attempt
to approximate how the matter would come out under the State
Department's standard, and the Department's refusal to file a
suggestion would be strong proof that it believed the sovereign was

First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972)
57.
(Douglas, J., concurring).
58.
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1996).
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 (2010).
59.
For an example of a pre-FSIA case where a party disputed the factual
60.
predicates underpinning the State Department's recommendation, see Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 723-24 (E.D. Va. 1961) (noting a factual dispute as to
the ownership of the vessel as the result of a mutiny that took place prior to the U.S.
Coast Guard taking control of the vessel).
BoRN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 236.
61.
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2284.
62.
Id.
63.
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not entitled to immunity. 64 Nonetheless, the ultimate determination
was an independent one.
The post-Samantar remand, however, presents a more
exceptional state of affairs. Here the Executive Branch is
affirmatively filing a conclusion that the foreign official is not entitled
to immunity65 (rather than simply declining to file and leaving the
matter for the court to decide). 66 The court then rejects the immunity
claim citing nothing other than the State Department's negative
filing. 67 Technically, then, the government's current view broadens
the circumstances in which the Executive Branch can tie the court's
hands.6 8
The risk of politicization undermines Congress's intentions in
this area. A key shortcoming of the pre-FSIA regime was that

See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 31-32, 38 (1945)
64.
(stating that the government's failure to recognize immunity is proof of the national
policy not to extend immunity); Compania Espafiola de Navegaci6n Maritima, S.A., v.
The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 71, 74 (1938); Heany v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F. 2d 501, 503
(2d Cir. 1971) (stating that the State Department's failure to suggest immunity is a
significant factor to consider when deciding whether immunity should be granted).
See Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4, at 6 ("Because the
65.
Executive Branch is taking an express position in this case, the Court should accept
and defer to the determination that the Defendant is not immune from suit.").
Ironically, shortly after it filed in Samantar,the State Department declined
66.
to express its views in another case. See Letter from Preet Bhara, to Hon. Lewis
Kaplan, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1:11-cv-00691-LAK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011).
In the interest of disclosure, I should note that since drafting this essay I was retained
to file an amicus brief in the Chevron litigation while it was on appeal in the Second
Circuit.
Wuerth, supranote 6, at 919 & n.2.
67.
See Order, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007)
68.
("The government has determined that the defendant does not have foreign official
immunity. Accordingly, defendant's common law sovereign immunity defense is no
longer before the Court."). In few cases have courts wrestled with the question of
whether a defendant is entitled to immunity despite an explicit filing by the State
Department reaching the contrary conclusion. For a rare pre-FSIA case in which a
court confronted (but declined to rule on) this "interesting question," see N.Y. & Cuba
Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that
because jurisdiction rested on a writ of attachment against the vessel, and the
attachment had been lifted, the court no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case and
decide the "interesting question" of sovereign immunity).
In support of its view of deference to a conclusion that immunity is unavailable, the
government cites Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945), for the
proposition that courts may not broaden immunity beyond the boundaries recognized
by the Executive Branch. Even assuming Hoffman was properly decided, that does not
resolve the matter. See, e.g., Jessup, supra note 28, at 168; Wuerth, supra note 2, at
924. At most, Hoffman stands for the proposition that a court should not extend the
scope of common law immunity beyond that established by the settled practice of the
Executive Branch. The case does not stand for the radically different proposition that a
court is affirmatively bound by the Executive Branch's recommendation that an official
be denied immunity. Indeed, elsewhere Hoffman reaffirms that "[i]n the absence of
recognition of the claimed immunity by the political branch of the government, the
courts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of immunity exist."
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34-35.
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immunity determinations easily became politicized as the Executive
Branch sought to accommodate or advance its foreign policy interests
through its determinations of whether a state or an official was
entitled to immunity. 69 Even when the determinations were not
political, the prospect of complete deference to the Executive Branch
created a condition of unwanted pressure for the Executive Branch.7 0
The FSIA removed these structural flaws in the system, but the
conception of executive lawmaking envisioned by the State
Department in Samantar threatens to reinstate that state of affairs.
Evolutions in the government's position on the issue of official
immunity exemplify these risks. In Matar v. Dichter, a pre-Samantar
case in the Second Circuit involving the immunity of a foreign official,
the State Department took the opportunity in its brief to lay out the
factors that would guide its own determination of whether a foreign
official was entitled to immunity.7 1 The test set forth in the Matar
brief was hardly a model of clarity but at least provided a starting
point for some predictability.
Since Samantar, the government appears to have abandoned the
approach taken in the Matar brief almost entirely. Its post-remand
statement of interest in Samantar, while repeating the general
principles of executive control from the Matar brief, does not even
refer to its standards. 72 At this symposium, various representatives of
the State Department distanced themselves from that brief and
claimed that it was the product of "another administration."7 3 Such
shifting views validate fears that the immunity determination will
vary with the political winds rather than be the product of principled
decision making if the matter were left to courts.
Administrative law provides a useful and valuable analogy here.
Under general principles of administrative law, courts will defer to
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes by an agency vested
with rulemaking authority under those statutes.7 4 The interpretation
can come in the form of a litigating position provided that the
agency's position is principled and consistent.7 5 The rationales for
this deference rest on a recognition of both the agency's expertise

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 716 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
69.
dissenting).
See id. (noting that Congress sought to "[reduce the foreign policy
70.
implications that "resulted from immunity determinations") (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 941487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605-06)).
71.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 9,
Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2579-cv).
72.
See Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4, at 2-6.
73.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Louis Henkin Professor in Human and Constitutional
Rights, Columbia Law Sch., Remarks at the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Symposium: Foreign State Immunity at Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84274.
46 (1984); 413 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 95 (2010).
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
75.
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relative to that of the courts, and the Executive's constitutional
prerogative to "take care" that the laws are faithfully executed.7 6
Measured by this standard, the current Administration's
abandonment of its prior position in Matar would strip it of any
entitlement to deference even under modest constitutionally
grounded Chevron principles. Given the absolute deference the
government is demanding in this context, the risk of intrusion on the
judiciary's prerogative to "say what the law is" is even greater.7 7
A recent example, outside the sovereign immunity context,
further illustrates how executive acts taken in the "adjudicative role"
implicate separation-of-powers concerns. A lingering issue in federal
practice is whether appellate courts have jurisdiction over
interlocutory orders refusing to dismiss cases on prudential grounds
such as comity.78 Like the immunity of foreign officials, such
doctrines are creatures of federal common law. In at least two
instances the government took the position that "[bjecause the United
States did not explicitly urge dismissal predicated on the adverse
foreign relations consequences of these suits, the collateral order
doctrine does not provide jurisdiction for these appeals."79
Here, too, the inter-branch conflict becomes apparent. As a
constitutional matter, control over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts rests largely with Congress.80 Pursuant to that power,
Congress generally grants appellate jurisdiction over "final decisions"
of the district courts (which the Court has interpreted to mean "final
judgments").81

76.
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 159 (5th ed. 2010).
77.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
78.
See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 602 n.73 (citing Ochoa Lizarbe v. Rivera
Rondon, 402 F. App'x 834, 837 (4th Cir. 2010), which "holds, with virtually no analysis,
that denials of post-Samantar official immunity under federal common law are
immediately appealable"). For recent discussions of the various roles that comity can
play in international civil litigation, see for example, Donald E. Childress, Comity as
Conflict: Resituating InternationalComity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
11 (2010); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Courts (Am. Soc'y Int'l
Law Conference Paper 2009), available at http://www.asil.org/files/dodge.pdf.
79.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Doe, 554 U.S. 909 (2008) (No. 07-81); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellees at 12, Balintulo v. Daimler AG, No. 09-2778-cv (2d Cir. 2009). In
the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I currently serve as counsel to an
amicus curiae supporting the appellants in Balintulo.
80.
See U.S. CONST. art. III; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 465 (1944)
("So much may be rested on Congress's plenary authority to define and control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts."); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A PRIMER FOR THE PEOPLE 9 (2d ed. 2000) (1988) ("While the Necessary and
Proper Clause empowers Congress to make federal-court authority over these cases
exclusive, it generally has not done so.").
81.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198,
203 (1999) ("[W]e have repeatedly interpreted § 1291 to mean that an appeal ordinarily
will not lie until after final judgment has been entered in a case.").
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Exceptions to that general rule have either come through statute
(such as the immediate appealability of denials of motions to compel
arbitration) 82 or through judicial decision (such as the collateral order
doctrine).8 3 Yet the logic of the Executive Branch's position is that it
can override this textual commitment and this longstanding history
and, instead, hold the keys to the appellate courthouse. Just like the
assertion of control over the immunity determination after Samantar,
the government's position on the immediate appealability of orders on
comity raises concerns that, when the Executive attempts to act in
the adjudicative capacity, it will intrude upon the roles played by
Congress and the courts.
Second, this adjudicative role for the Executive undermines the
clarity and consistency so important to this area of the law.
Ironically, in the same term that it decided Samantar, the Court
announced Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a decision interpreting the federal
diversity statute. 84 In another unanimous opinion, the Court wrote:
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and
money as the parties litigate, not the merits of the case, but which court
is the right court to decide those claims. Complex tests produce appeals
and reversals, encourage gamesmanship, and, again diminish the
likelihood that results and settlements will reflect a claim's legal and
85
factual merits. Judicial resources too are at stake.

Yet in almost every respect, the sort of adjudicative role
envisioned by the State Department after Samantar is inconsistent
with this objective. For one thing, we do not even know whether the
"official immunity" test is jurisdictional. Consequently, may a court
resolve the "official immunity" question before determining its
jurisdiction (as in the forum non conveniens determination), or must
it instead resolve jurisdictional and other non-merits issues before it
can consider the "official immunity" question (as in the act of state
determination)?86 If the "official immunity" determination is not
jurisdictional, can a foreign official successfully remove the case from
state court?8 7
Moreover, even assuming that the foregoing impediments can be
overcome, what standards will govern the "official immunity"

82.

9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).

83.
See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949)
(holding appealable claims that are collateral to rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
84.
Hertz Corp., 130 S. Ct. at 1193.
85.
See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432-36
86.
(2007) (holding that a district court has discretion to respond at once to a defendant's
forum non conveniens plea, and need not take up any other threshold objection); see
also In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that it is proper to
dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens without reaching the FSIA issue).
87.
See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 603-04 (discussing the risk of forum
shopping by filing the case in a way to avoid federal jurisdiction).
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determination? As already noted, Samantar provides no meaningful
guidance on this question. Moreover, the government's current
position provides virtually no guidance to litigants or courts.
The post-remand statement of interest in Samantar exemplifies
the problem. Ultimately, the State Department concludes that
Samantar is not entitled to immunity.8 8 The precise reasons for that
conclusion are, however, far from clear. For example, the
government's statement explains that the State Department's
determination is based "[u]pon consideration of the facts and
circumstances in this case, as well as the applicable principles of
customary international law."8 9 Yet the government's brief does not
explain how precisely it takes principles of customary international
law into account (apart from a passing reference to the "official
capacity" requirement for official immunity). 90
Elsewhere, the government's brief stresses that two key facts
drive its conclusion that Samantar is not entitled to immunity: (1) the
lack of a recognized government in Somalia, and (2) Samantar's
residence in Virginia since 1997.91 While these facts are certainly
accurate, the government's statement of interest nowhere explains
why they are dispositive.9 2 Nor does it explain why other facts-such
as Samantar's role in the former Somali government and that, at the
time of the alleged conduct, the Somali government was recognized by
the United States-are seemingly irrelevant to (or less weighty) in
the determination. Tellingly, the government's brief places no weight
on the fact that Samantar was alleged to have violated the Torture
Victim Protection Act and to have sanctioned torture, a violation of
customary international law. Can one therefore infer from its failure
to mention these factors that such factors are, going forward,
irrelevant to the immunity inquiry?
Despite the significance of these two critical facts, the
government's statement of interest elsewhere betrays the lingering
unpredictability of this inquiry. For example, after identifying the
centrality of the two above-referenced facts, the statement of interest
contains a massive hedge:
[The State Department's determination] has taken into account the
potential impact of such a decision [denying immunity] on the foreign

Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4, at 7.
88.
89.
Id.; see also Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Tony West, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 11, 2011),
reprinted in Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4, exhibit 1 ("In light of these
circumstances, taking into account the relevant principles of customary international
law, and considering the overall impact of this matter on the foreign policy of the
United States, the Department of State has determined that Defendant Samantar does
not enjoy immunity. . . .").
90.
Samantar Statement of Interest, supra note 4, at 8.
91.
See id. at 7-9.
92.
Id.
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relations of the United States. In future cases, presenting different
circumstances, the Department could determine either that a former
official of a state without a recognized government is immune from civil
suit for acts taken in an official capacity, or that a former official of a
state with a recognized government is not immune from a civil suit for
93
acts that were not taken in an official capacity.

In other words, the two above-mentioned facts are "particularly
significant," except when the State Department says they are not.
The distinction across cases, of course, may turn upon the
"potential impact of such a decision on the foreign relations of the
United States."94 The letter from the State Department Legal
Adviser, attached to the government's statement of interest, alludes
to this matter as well.95 Yet neither the statement of interest nor the
letter explains precisely the method used by the government to weigh
the foreign relations impact of the determination. This is curious
because, as the government admits, one entity purporting to speak for
the Somali government, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG),
urged immunity on Samantar's behalf, and the United States
"supports the efforts of the TFG to establish a viable central
government."9 6
In light of this support (albeit in a situation where the United
States does not formally recognize a government in Somalia), how
precisely did the State Department take into account the impact of
the determination on U.S. foreign relations when it would appear
that its immunity determination undermines the efforts of an
(unrecognized) entity whose efforts it apparently supports? In
contrast to the relatively vague letter offered here, other statements
of interest (typically offered when the Executive is speaking in the
above-described prudential role) offer a much fuller explanation for
how a case would or would not affect the foreign relations of the
United States.97
Not only does the emphasis on these facts (and their relationship
to U.S. foreign relations) raise a host of ambiguities, but the
government appears to recognize the tension between its current
"totality of the circumstances" approach and the approach set forth in

93.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
94.
Id.
95.
Id. exhibit 1.
96.
Id.
Compare Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
97.
Affirmance at 16, Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F. 3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 0536210) (describing the potential foreign policy implications that would result from
adopting aiding-and-abetting ATS liability, including interfering with the Executive's
ability to use economic engagement "as a method of encouraging reform and gaining
leverage with that country"), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12,
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Doe, 554 U.S. 909 (2008) (No. 07-91) (noting that adjudication of
respondents' state-law tort claims would interfere with the United States' conduct of
foreign policy, but not explaining what the potential foreign policy implications were).
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its brief before the Supreme Court. In a f6otnote in its statement of
interest, the government acknowledges that its Supreme Court filing
identified a broader array of factors potentially relevant to the
immunity determination." Yet now it appears to be attempting to
assert even greater discretionary power:
The identification of certain circumstances that the Executive could or
might find it appropriate to take into account served to underscore the
range of discretion properly residing in the Executive under the
Constitution to make immunity determination in particular cases. It
did not reflect a judgment by the Executive that the considerations
mentioned were exhaustive or would necessarily be relevant to any
particular immunity determination if, as the United States argued to
the Supreme Court, the responsibility for doing so was vested in the
Executive and not governed by the FSIA. The present filing reflects the
99
basis for the Executive's immunity determination in this case.

From the statement of interest one gets the sense that it is the
product of such extensive inter-agency squabble.1 00 At the end of the
day, the process of achieving consensus around a litigating position
will almost certainly prevent the government from articulating any
consistent set of standards by which parties or courts can predict
across cases whether immunity will attach.
At bottom, if the statement of interest in the post-remand
Samantar proceedings is any indication, the approach adopted by the
State Department hardly provides litigants and courts the sort of
guidance that the Hertz Court deemed so essential in this area. 0 1

98.
Samantar Statement of Interest, supranote 4, at 5 n.2.
99.
Id.
100.
As the pre-FSIA practice illustrates, such squabbles can erupt into fullblown public disagreements. Perhaps most famously, in The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216
(1921), the U.S. Department of State had concluded that sovereign immunity should
not be accorded, because of its view that the vessel was a commercial one (not a public
one) and the dispute was purely commercial. The Department of Justice disagreed,
however, and refused to submit the Department of State's views to the Court. The
Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479-80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Other Public Vessels, 2 Hackworth
DIGEST § 173, at 429-30, 438-39.
101.
Here, it is worth heeding the sage words of John Bellinger III when
commenting on the federal common law or executive branch deference framework
developed after Sosa in the context of litigation under the Alien Tort Statute:
[C]ase-by-case participation can put the Executive Branch in a difficult spot.
Foreign governments will continue to press U.S. administrations to weigh in on
their behalf in ATS litigation. If the Executive is expected to weigh in when
litigation presents foreign policy concerns, courts may come to infer (wrongly)
from its silence in other cases that there are no such concerns. In addition,
foreign governments may come to regard the Executive's decisions whether or
not to file as a reflection of the United States' view of the bilateral relationship
with that government. Domestically, foreign policy submissions will often be
read as partisan support for the activities of foreign governments over the
deserving interests of plaintiff victims.
John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11 (2009).
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This brave new world after Samantar undermines the FSIA's goal of
"settl[ing] foreign sovereigns' prospective expectations for being
subject to suit in American courts and . . . ensur[ing] fair and
evenhanded treatment to our citizens who have claims against
foreign sovereigns. "102

To summarize this part, the Executive Branch performs four
different functions in matters of international civil litigation: amicus,
prudential, head of state, and adjudicative. These functions differ
principally with respect to their effect on separation of powers
principles and the extent to which they encroach upon the activities
of the coordinate branches of government.
Among the four functions, the adjudicative function (the function
that the State Department envisions for itself with respect to foreign
after Samantar) is most
official immunity determinations
troublesome. That function undercuts the judiciary's prerogative to
determine its own jurisdiction, potentially undermines Congress's
legislative prerogative in this area, and undermines the clarity so
essential to jurisdictional rules, a clarity that is particularly
important in this area of the law. The next section anticipates
criticisms of this thesis.

III. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES

This section responds to potential objections to the view
expressed above-namely, that courts should be wary of efforts by the
Executive Branch to act in the adjudicative role. Here I consider two
such objections-one rooted in historical practice and one rooted in
head of state immunity.
The historical criticism is as follows: the Executive Branch has
long enjoyed control over immunity determinations, including
determinations of the immunity of foreign officials. Given that
nothing in the FSIA purported to strip the Executive of that power,
permitting the Executive to control the immunity determination
merely continues that longstanding practice.
This argument suffers from several flaws. For one thing, it is a
bit misleading. The answer turns critically on the level of generality
at which it is assessed. At a high level of generality, the proposition is
certainly accurate-the Executive Branch has a longstanding history
of making "immunity" determinations. 0 3 At a greater level of
specificity, however, the proposition begins to break down. With
respect to foreign government officials, the practice is neither as

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 737 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
102.
dissenting).
Wuerth, supra note 6, at 924.
103.
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historically rooted nor as well established.104 Even the government
admitted in its brief in Samantar that there were only a few
precedents on the issue, 10 5 and an exhaustive study of State
Department determinations of official immunity in the years
following the Tate Letter only turned up a few examples.106
This analysis naturally begs the question about the appropriate
level of generality at which to evaluate executive practice. To this
question, there is ample reason to suspect that the more specific level
is the proper one. Here, the Court's recent decision in Medellin v.
Texas is instructive. 107
Medellin involved, among other things, a claim by the Executive
Branch that, pursuant to its power to conduct foreign affairs, an
executive order could displace state rules, such as the state
procedural default rules in post-conviction proceedings. 0 8 In support
of that position, the government cited the American Insurance Ass'n
v. Garamendi decision, which held that a sole executive agreement
displaced a California law providing for discovery from certain
insurance companies and extending the statute of limitations.109
Critical for present purposes, the Medellin Court rejected the
government's reliance on Garamendi and described Garamendi in
narrow terms, involving "a narrow set of circumstances: the making
of executive agreements to settle civil claims between American
citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals," which enjoyed
"a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned.""x0
the "longstanding practice" of
Court contrasted
The
congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement with the
"unprecedented action" of a presidential directive addressed to state
courts.x 1 The Medellin Court's skepticism over sweeping assertions
of executive power and its narrow characterization of Garamendi
suggest that it likewise would require a well established historical
practice before endorsing the view that the Executive Branch enjoys

104.
Id.
Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 9 ("In light of the potentially
105.
significant foreign relations consequences of subjecting another sovereign state to suit
in our courts, the Court historically looked to "the political branch of the government
charged with the conduct of foreign affairs" to determine whether immunity should be
recognized.").
106.
See generally Sovereign Immunity Determinations of the Department of
State, May 1952 to January. 1977, 1977 DIGEST app., 1017-81.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
107.
108.
Id. at 493-94.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-28 (2003); Brief for the
109.
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, 15, 25, Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).
110.
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
111.
Id. at 532.
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an unrestricted power over the immunity of foreign officials binding
on federal courts.11 2
Moreover, the State Department's proposed approach following
Samantar, much like the presidential directive in Medellin, runs the

risk of intruding uponstate exercises of jurisdiction. Imagine a case
in which a foreign plaintiff sued a former foreign government official
in state court (in a manner such that the case does not otherwise
qualify for federal jurisdiction).1 3 Would the State Department's
power to determine the official's entitlement to immunity extend to
the state court proceedings? The logic of its position suggests that it
would.
For one thing, insofar as that power ultimately derives from its
foreign affairs powers, other doctrines-like the act of state doctrine
or the political - question doctrine-suggest that the executive
determination has effect in state court. 114 Moreover, as a functional
matter, the State Department's power would have to extend so far;
otherwise, a plaintiff could attempt to circumvent the immunity
simply through creative forum shopping.115 Thus, in an effort to
effectuate its role, the State Department would be telling the state
court how to exercise its jurisdiction, an assertion of executive power
to which (when not backed by a congressional sanction or a
longstanding practice) Medellin expressed great skepticism.116
Apart from the level of generality questions, the argument from
history suffers from a separate flaw: .it overlooks the fact that any
assertion of executive power in this area must exist alongside the
FSIA. Here it is important to note two possible versions of the
historical argument. One argument is firmly rooted in the
Constitution and suggests that, pursuant to its general foreign affairs
powers (a proposition itself that is more a product of history and

112.
See Mark Weisburd, Medellin, the President's Foreign Affairs Power and
Domestic Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 595, 624-27 (2010) (arguing that the
Medellin opinion essentially narrows the broad language in Garamendithat executive
agreements concerning with federal foreign policy preempt state law).
113.
As I explain elsewhere, Samantar sets up precisely this possibility. See
Rutledge, supra note 2, at 603-04.
114.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 763-64 (discussing the similarity
of the foreign sovereign immunity rules, the act of state doctrine, and the political
question doctrine).
. 115.Precisely for this reason Congress provided for the removability of suits
against foreign states based on the immunity defense. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of

Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
116.
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531-32. Admittedly, Medellin might be distinguished
on the ground that the intrusion in that case concerned final state criminal judgments,
as opposed to pending civil cases. As the Court has expressed elsewhere, the state's
exercise of its police powers in the criminal context is an especially important
component of our federalism. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3
(1995) (commenting on the "sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction" in the context of the states' police power).
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jurisprudence than text)117 the Executive controls immunity
determinations.11 8 The problem with this argument is that, under its
logic, the FSIA unconstitutionally intrudes upon that power. 119
A second, more modest version of the argument is that the
Executive Branch has interstitial authority to make immunity
determinations subject to congressional override if Congress chooses
to regulate the matter by statute (as it did in the FSIA). Under that
version of the argument, the need for compatibility between any
executive exercise of authority and a parallel congressional
enactment becomes clear. Unreviewable State Department
determinations about the immunity of foreign officials are
inconsistent with that model. Such unreviewable determinations
raise a host of questions, such as whether the immunity exceptions
are parallel, what law determines whether the government official
was acting in his official capacity, and the removability of the case to
federal courts.1 20 Thus, the historical argument does not justify a
system of complete deference to the Executive Branch.
The second objection to the position offered here concerns its
implications for head of state immunity. 12 1 Regardless of how official
immunity should be determined, it remains the case that the
Executive Branch determines whether a foreign official qualifies as a
head of state.122 When the Executive so determines, that
determination binds the lower courts and requires them to dismiss
the case against the head of state.12 3 This determination is not
117.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 18 (acknowledging executive
foreign affairs powers "[d]espite fairly modest textual foundation in the Constitution.").
118.
See Lewis S. Yelin, Head of State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking,
44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911, 925-26 (2011) ("[Deference to] Executive Branch
determinations of foreign sovereign immunity . . . [is] grounded in the Constitution's
separation of powers and the Executive Branch's lead role in foreign affairs.").
See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
119.
of 1976 in Perspective: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 304 (1986)
("[Pressured] for change . . . the State Department had become an advocate for
transferring the resolution of sovereign immunity disputes to the courts. . . . The
executive branch sent a first draft of the FSIA to Congress early in 1973.").
See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 597-605 (providing analysis of these
120.
questions).
Similar questions arise with respect to special missions immunity, another
121.
foreign relations immunity rooted entirely in federal common law and predicated on
executive lawmaking. See Convention on Special Missions, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force June 21, 1985) (outlining international
agreements regarding bounds of special missions immunity); Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai,
568 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2008) (collecting cases on executive branch involvement
in special missions immunity); Draft Articles on Special Missions with Commentaries,
[1967] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 347, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.1 (clarifying the
intended bounds of special missions immunity). On this point, I thank Ed Swaine for
his guidance.
122.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 239 (observing that recognition of
foreign entities "has been left largely to the discretion of the U.S. Executive Branch").
123.
See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2004) ("We are
required to defer to the decision of the Executive Branch."); United States v. Noriega,
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limited only to premiers of the state, but can extend to senior
ministers acting on the premier's behalf as well as family
members.124

I acknowledge that head of state immunity raises a particular
challenge to the view advanced here. Like official immunity
determinations after Samantar, it exemplifies the sort of executive
activity I have characterized as adjudicative.1 25 Those determinations
are being made without any congressional authorization.126
Moreover, as I understand from conversations with current and
former State Department employees who have been involved in such
determinations, they often are made after the Executive Branch is
aware of the pending litigation, in contrast to the credentialing of
diplomats. Thus, if my criticism of adjudicative determinations by the
Executive Branch is accurate, then head of state immunity doctrine
at least is in need of revision.
Ultimately, though, I do not think that the view offered here is
inconsistent with the current doctrine of head of state immunity. 27
The critical distinction between head of state immunity and foreign
official immunity (as in Samantar)is that the Executive Branch's role
to make head of state immunity enjoys an explicit constitutional
basis. Specifically, Article II vests the Executive with the power to
"make treaties" and to "receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers."128 These are among the few powers related to the
maintenance of foreign affairs that the Constitution expressly confers
on the Executive Branch.129
Once one accepts the textual basis for these powers, it naturally
follows that the Executive Branch must have the ability to engage in
interstate relations with heads of state. Immunity then becomes
necessary to facilitate those interstate relations. Thus, head of state
immunity represents a limited area, traceable to an express
constitutional provision, where the Executive Branch appropriately
enjoys an adjudicatory role.

117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[W]here the Executive Branch either expressly
grants or denies a request to grant immunity, court must follow that direction .... .").
See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 257 (discussing head of state
immunity and the weight given by courts to the views of the Executive Branch).
124.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 255 (concluding that head of state
immunity extends beyond heads of state themselves).
125.
See supra Part II.
126.
Id.
127.
Here, I wish to express my gratitude to Lewis Yelin for his thoughts on this
point, as we both have grappled with the conceptual relationship between head of state
immunity and foreign official immunity under Samantar.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
128.
129.
See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 21, at 18 n.123 (noting the
Constitution's "not especially impressive" grants of foreign affairs authority to the
President).
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By contrast, foreign official immunity stands on very different
footing. Such immunity determinations advance neither the
Executive Branch's power to "make treaties" nor its power to "receive"
ambassadors and public ministers.1 30 Rather, as the State
Department appears to conceptualize it, foreign official immunity
concerns an assessment of (a) the acts taken by the foreign official
(often on foreign sovereign territory) and (b) any present
circumstances (such as the position of the current government or the
whereabouts of the foreign defendant) that affect the official's
amenability to jurisdiction.13 1 Such determinations neither explicitly
nor implicitly implicate these textually conferred powers of the
Executive Branch.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Samantar represents the latest iteration in an ongoing debate
about the relationship between federal common law and executive
power. While the Executive Branch can fulfill various roles in
litigation touching upon the foreign relations of the United States,
the adjudicative role, which is the role apparently granted to the
government in foreign official immunity determinations after
Samantar, is the most problematic (at least when it is not pursuant
to a congressional mandate). That role raises significant separationof-powers concerns and undermines the clarity so essential in cases of
this sort.
This conclusion carries two important implications. First, courts
should be wary of efforts by the Executive Branch to extend its
adjudicatory role into other areas. Second, and perhaps more
controversially, these concerns counsel more generally against
judicial adventures into the field of federal common law, particularly
where that exercise of federal common law sits at best uncomfortably
alongside a congressional statute regulating a closely related area.
The Court would be far better to refrain from such adventures and
2
thereby spark Congress to fill the gap in its statutory scheme.'

130.
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
131.
See Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 6 ("[The Executive reasonably
could find it appropriate to take into account petitioner's residence in the United
States ... the nature of the acts alleged . . . and the lack of any recognized government
of Somalia that could opine on whether petitioner's alleged actions were taken in an
official capacity. . . .").
See Rutledge, supra note 2, at 606-08 (advocating similar judicial pressure
132.
on Congress to close the doctrinal gaps in sovereign immunity law).
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